УДК 34 International Journal Of Professional Science №11(1.1)

Intellectual rights to musical works created using artificial intelligence in the Russian Federation

Pakhunov Mikhail
Scientific supervisor: Privalova N.I.

1. The Magister`s Student of Law Faculty
The North Western branch of the Federal State Budget-Funded Educational Institution of Higher Education «The Russian State University of Justice named after V.M. Lebedev»
2. Associate Professor, Ph.D., Department of Humanitarian and Socio-economic Disciplines, The North Western branch of the Federal State Budget-Funded Educational Institution of Higher Education «The Russian State University of Justice named after V.M. Lebedev»

Abstract:

Over the past decade, we have witnessed the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology and its increasingly widespread application, ranging from creative activities to heavy industry. For example, the Russian Federation is currently working on introducing artificial intelligence into judicial proceedings, as in recent years, AI technology has become increasingly effective in performing auxiliary functions related to information retrieval, document analysis, and the preparation of drafts thereof. However, the more artificial intelligence develops and its ability to imitate humans improves, the more frequently questions arise regarding the legal status of artificial intelligence in the Russian Federation and that of the results of intellectual activity obtained through its use, particularly in areas where its application can already substantially replace active human involvement.

Keywords:

Intellectual rights, artificial intelligence, musical works, objects of intellectual rights.

  1. Introduction

According to the Federal State Statistics Service, in 2025, the share of organizations in the Russian Federation that used artificial intelligence technologies amounted to 5.2% of the total number of surveyed organizations [1]. In 2024, the share of such organizations was 4.8% [2]. Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by the VCIOM Analytical Center, as of October 2025, one in two respondents (51%) had used artificial intelligence technologies at least once [3]. These data indicate the continued growth in the popularity of artificial intelligence across various spheres of modern society [4].

For several years now, Internet services for creating (editing) musical works using artificial intelligence technologies have been gaining increasingly widespread use in the Russian Federation. However, the legal protection of such works and the legal framework governing their creation and editing through artificial intelligence are virtually absent from Russian legislation. This leads to legal uncertainty in the regulation of the activities of such Internet services and, more broadly, in the application of intellectual property rights to musical works created or edited using such services.

  1. Material and methods

The legal nature of artificial intelligence

Pursuant to Clause 1, Part 1, Article 3 of Federal Law No. 243-FZ of July 26, 2026, «On Supporting the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technologies in the Russian Federation», artificial intelligence is defined as: «a set of technological solutions that enables the imitation of human cognitive functions (including the ability to independently improve its functions, increase the accuracy of decisions through the analysis of new data, and perform a search for solutions without a predefined algorithm) and to obtain, when performing specific tasks, results comparable to or superior to those of human intellectual activity. The set of technological solutions includes information and communication infrastructure, software (including software employing machine learning methods), data processing processes and services, and solution-search services». In this definition, we consider it important to focus on the fact that artificial intelligence itself is, first and foremost, precisely a «set of technological solutions» (technology) [5]. This means that artificial intelligence cannot possess desires or needs, nor can it form its own will or express it [6]. Consequently, it is an object of civil legal relations, and by no means a subject thereof.

Here, it is worth additionally drawing a comparison with the legal nature of legal entities. As follows from Clause 1, Article 48 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the «CC RF»):  «A legal entity is an organization that has separate property and is liable for its obligations with such property, may acquire and exercise civil rights and assume civil obligations in its own name, and may act as a plaintiff and defendant in court».

Artificial intelligence does not possess property of its own and is itself the property of other persons; it cannot acquire rights, assume obligations, or, moreover, participate in judicial proceedings. Therefore, it is important to note that there is no justified purpose or reason for recognizing artificial intelligence as a subject of civil legal relations [7]. It constitutes precisely an object within these legal relations.

Musical works created using artificial intelligence as an object of intellectual rights

Pursuant to Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 1, Article 1225 of the CC RF, the results of intellectual activity (hereinafter referred to as «RIAs») include works of science, literature, and art.

As follows from Article 1226 of the CC RF, intellectual property rights are recognized in respect of RIAs. These rights include an exclusive right, which is a property right, as well as, in cases provided for by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, personal non-property rights and other rights.

Pursuant to Paragraph 3, Article 1228 of the CC RF: «The exclusive right to a result of intellectual activity created through creative labor initially arises with its author».

Pursuant to Paragraph 1, Article 1258 of the CC RF, musical works are recognized as objects of copyright in the Russian Federation. Based on the combined provisions of Articles 1228 and 1257 of the CC RF, the author of a musical work is recognized as the individual whose creative labor resulted in its creation. At the same time, pursuant to Paragraph 1, Article 1228 of the CC RF: «Individuals who have not made a personal creative contribution to the creation of such a result shall not be recognized as authors of a result of intellectual activity, including those who have provided the author thereof solely with technical, advisory, organizational, or material assistance or support, or have merely contributed to the formalization of rights to such a result or its use, as well as individuals who have exercised control over the performance of the relevant work».

Based on the aforementioned provisions, the following question arises: can a musical work created using artificial intelligence be recognized as an object of intellectual property rights if the user (the person commissioning the work) has not engaged in any creative labor? For example, if the user has selected the «generate a random song» option or provided a prompt for a musical work containing predominantly organizational rather than creative instructions, such as: «Create a song in the hip-hop genre at a tempo of 110 BPM».

In order to examine this issue, it is necessary to determine what constitutes creative labor in the Russian Federation. Russian legislation does not provide a mandatory statutory definition of creative labor. However, the following points are important to mention:

  • In Paragraph 80 of Resolution No. 10 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the «SC RF») dated April 23, 2019, «On the Application of Part Four of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation», the SC RF clarified that only a result created through creative labor may constitute an object of copyright. At the same time, unless proven otherwise, RIAs are presumed to have been created through creative labor. The Supreme Court also clarified that the absence of novelty, uniqueness, and/or originality in a RIA activity does not mean that such a result was not created through creative labor. The creative nature of the process of creating a work does not depend on whether the work was created by the author personally or with the use of technical means. However, RIAs activity created using technical means in the absence of any creative human activity do not constitute objects of copyright (for example, video footage recorded by an automatic surveillance camera).
  • It follows from Paragraph 5, Article 1259 of the CC RF that: «Copyright does not extend to ideas, concepts, principles, methods, processes, systems, methods of solving technical, organizational, or other problems, discoveries, facts, programming languages, or geological information about mineral resources».

Taking into account the positions of the SC RF and the provisions of the CC RF, it can be concluded that, in the Russian Federation, the fundamental criterion for recognizing an RIA as an object of intellectual property rights is the creative nature of its creation, that is, the creative process itself. At the same time, normative criteria for determining whether the creation process is creative are virtually absent, which makes the question of whether a musical work created using artificial intelligence can be classified as an object of intellectual property rights a matter of legal debate.

Moreover, in our view, this position of the SC RF eliminates any uncertainty regarding the recognition of the developer or owner of the relevant artificial intelligence service as the author of a musical work created using artificial intelligence. The development of such technology, ownership of it, and making it available to users for their activities do not fall within the scope of creative human activity as defined by the SC RF. However, this observation does not resolve the previously raised question of whether a musical work created using artificial intelligence can be recognized as an object of intellectual property rights.

At the same time, different practices are emerging in other countries. For example, in 2022, New Zealand recognized the company that owns the relevant technology for creating such works as the author of a work created by artificial intelligence [8]. In Japan, this issue is determined by the court on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances [9].

When discussing this issue, as well as the criterion of the creative nature of creating a musical work using artificial intelligence, we consider it important to examine, by way of example, the foreign Internet service for creating and editing music, «Suno», which is available in the Russian Federation, specifically its Terms of Service published on the service’s official website [10].

We consider it necessary to highlight the following provisions of these Terms of Service:

  • «Under no circumstances will Suno be liable in any way for any content or materials of any third parties (including users), including for any errors or omissions in any content, or for any loss or damage of any kind incurred as a result of the use of any such content. You acknowledge that Suno does not pre-screen content, but that Suno and its designees will have the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to refuse or remove any content that is available via the Service. Without limiting the foregoing, Suno and its designees will have the right to remove any content that violates these Terms of Service, Suno’s community guidelines at https://suno.com/community-guidelines, or is deemed by Suno, in its sole discretion, to be otherwise objectionable»;
  • «You agree that you must evaluate, and bear all risks associated with, the use of any content, including any reliance on the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of such content»;
  • «You represent and warrant that you own or have obtained all necessary right, title and interest in and to any Submissions, including all copyrights and rights of publicity contained therein, and that you possess all necessary rights or have obtained all consents necessary to grant Suno the rights and licenses herein. As between you and Suno, you retain all right, title, and interest in and to your Submissions».
  • «Nothing in these Terms of Service transfers or assigns to Suno any ownership interest in your Submissions, and no license granted herein shall be construed to diminish, extinguish, or impair your ownership of your Submissions»;
  • «By using the Service or otherwise transmitting Submissions to us, you are directing Suno to store those Submissions, and grant to Suno and our affiliates, successors, assigns, and designees a worldwide, non-exclusive, fully paid-up, sublicensable (directly and indirectly through multiple tiers), assignable, royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use, reproduce, store, modify, distribute, create derivative works based on, perform, display, communicate, transmit and otherwise make available any and all Content (in whole or in part), in each case, in any media now known or hereafter developed, in connection with the provision, use, monetization, promotion, marketing, and improvement of our products and services, including the Service and the artificial intelligence and machine learning models related to the Service».

It follows from the foregoing that «Suno» classifies any work created using artificial intelligence on its platform, whether musical or otherwise, as an object of intellectual property rights.

Since Russian legislation does not provide a precise definition of creative labor or clear criteria for determining the creative nature of human activity, the Terms of Service of Suno and their classification of any musical work created using artificial intelligence on its platform as an object of intellectual property rights are, formally, consistent with the legislation of the Russian Federation and the existing general criteria of creative labor, including by virtue of the principle of freedom of contract.

Differentiation of intellectual rights

Given the de facto recognition of musical works created using artificial intelligence as objects of intellectual property rights, including cases where no actual creative labor has been performed by a human, we consider it justified to examine the distinction between the intellectual property rights applicable to such objects.

As previously mentioned, intellectual property rights are recognized in respect of RIAs and include an exclusive right, as well as personal non-property rights and other rights in cases provided for by the CC RF.

Consequently, under the general rules of the CC RF, arising from the combined provisions of Articles 1229 and 1255 and Chapter 71, the following rights should apply to a musical work, including one created using artificial intelligence:

  • Exclusive right (the right to use an RIA at the discretion of the right holder);
  • Copyright (exclusive right, right of authorship, right to a name, right to the integrity of the work, and right to make the work available to the public);
  • Related rights (rights to a performance, broadcasting rights, rights to a phonogram, database producer’s rights, and publisher’s rights).

Let us now once again refer to several provisions of the Terms of Service of «Suno» [10]:

  • «Subject to your compliance with these Terms of Service, if you are a user who has subscribed to the Pro or Premier paid tier of the Service, Suno hereby assigns to you all of its right, title and interest in and to any Output owned by Suno and generated from Submissions made by you through the Service, provided such Output will remain subject to these Terms of Service including any applicable commercial use restrictions. Due to the nature of machine learning, Suno makes no representation or warranty to you that any copyright will vest in any Output»;
  • «If you are a user of the free or basic tier of the Service then you covenant and agree that you will only use such Outputs for your lawful, personal and non-commercial purposes»;
  • «Except as permitted in the next section, you agree not to display, distribute, license, perform, publish, reproduce, duplicate, copy, create derivative works from, modify, sell, resell, grant access to, transfer, or otherwise use or exploit any portion of the Service, and any Output or Voice Model, for any commercial purposes»;
  • «For the avoidance of doubt, Output may be publicly available in a third party application such as Discord, where it may be viewable, downloadable, and modified by other users of that third party application. If the Output becomes publicly available in such third-party application, you agree that other users have a right to access, display, view, store, modify, and copy such Output; provided, however, that you may change your settings to bypass these public sharing default settings so that Output generated will remain private».

By comparing the provisions established by Russian legislation with the Terms of Service of «Suno», we arrive at the conclusion that, in practice, we are observing legal relations identical to those arising under an author’s order agreement, as provided for in Article 1288 of the CC RF.

The similarities between these legal relations are manifested in the following:

  • One party (the nominal author, represented by «Suno») undertakes, at the request of the other party (the user-customer, who submits a prompt for the creation or editing of a work), to create (edit) a specified work of art, as stipulated by the agreement (Terms of Service), in a tangible medium or in another form, namely, in electronic form in the example under consideration;
  • The exclusive right is substantially restricted in accordance with the terms of the agreement (Terms of Service). «Suno» establishes restrictions on the customer’s use of the resulting musical work for commercial purposes.

At the same time, there are also differences between the Terms of Service of «Suno» and a standard author’s order agreement:

  • In practice, the agreement with «Suno» constitutes a mixed agreement containing elements of an author’s order agreement and a license agreement, supplemented by specific provisions governing the commercial use of the musical work created, as well as provisions granting «Suno» related rights in such a work;
  • «Suno» (the artificial intelligence operating within its Internet service) is not the author of the work, even if the user-customer has made no creative contribution to its creation. This follows both from the Terms of Service themselves and from the aforementioned positions of the SC RF regarding the nature of human creative labor in the creation of RIAs.
  1. Results and discussion

Having examined the legal nature of artificial intelligence, its definition as an object of intellectual property rights, and the distinction between the intellectual property rights applicable to it, we present the following conclusions:

  1. In the Russian Federation, the question of recognizing, at the legislative level, a musical work created using artificial intelligence as an object of intellectual property rights remains unresolved. At present, there is a high probability that, taking into account the position of the SC RF regarding the requirement for human creative activity, as well as the Terms of Service of the Internet service «Suno», which provides music creation (editing) using artificial intelligence, such a musical work would be recognized as an object of intellectual property rights in the event of a dispute or another situation requiring the determination of its legal status;
  2. In the Russian Federation, the distinction between intellectual property rights applicable to musical works created using artificial intelligence remains general in nature, allowing various Internet services, such as «Suno», to independently determine the specific scope and limitations of intellectual property rights and their allocation with respect to such musical works. This approach is consistent with the principle of freedom of contract and the dispositive provisions of Part Four of the CC RF.

For the purposes of academic discussion, we consider it necessary to present the following viewpoints:

  1. Pchelkin, while recognizing a work created by artificial intelligence as an RIA, proposed linking the legal protection of such works to the framework of related rights. For example, the protection of the rights of an artificial intelligence developer could follow the model of protection afforded to the rights of a publisher. It is proposed that a work created by artificial intelligence enter the public domain, while the artificial intelligence developer or another person who organized its creation acquires the exclusive publisher’s right to the work made available to the public [11].
  2. Dzeboev, having noted the similarities with an author’s order agreement, proposes the creation of a separate legal institution analogous to the legal regulation of author’s order agreements. The user would act as the customer, at whose request artificial intelligence creates a work. It is proposed that, in exchange for remuneration paid to the artificial intelligence developer, the exclusive rights, as well as the right to make the work available to the public, be transferred to the customer. At the same time, it is proposed that copyright be disregarded, since it is inextricably linked to the personality of the author, who must be a human being, whereas artificial intelligence that creates a work is not a human being [12].

The aforementioned positions offer different approaches to distinguishing intellectual property rights in works created using artificial intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to establish and specify the legal protection afforded to the developer of the artificial intelligence used to create a particular work.

If the aforementioned positions are considered in general terms, we can agree with them, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the need to protect the rights of artificial intelligence developers and services (such as «Suno») that make such technologies available for use by users. However, upon closer examination of the proposals put forward by T. Dzeboev and A. Pchelkin, our position differs.

In our view, the existing provisions of Russian civil legislation governing intellectual property rights and the scope of their application make it possible, at present, to regulate the determination and allocation of intellectual property rights between the user and the artificial intelligence developer with respect to musical works created using the relevant artificial intelligence technology with sufficient effectiveness. In our opinion, the main problem in understanding and applying intellectual property rights to works created using artificial intelligence lies in the absence of legislative recognition of the status of such works as objects of intellectual property rights and, at the same time, the absence of clear statutory criteria for determining the creative nature of human activity in the creation of RIAs, as well as the absence of a statutory definition of creative labor as a characteristic of an RIA.

Continuing our examination of other authors’ positions, it is worth mentioning the proposal put forward by P. K. Pakshin, who offers the following perspective on the creative nature of human activity in creating a work using artificial intelligence:

«It can be said that artificial intelligence facilitates communication between the authors of the source data and the user who formulates the request. In this case, the closest analogy appears to be that of databases, except that artificial intelligence goes further by creating new data based on the data it has studied. Without affecting the traditionally established understanding of legal personality, our approach suggests replacing the criterion of creativity with the criterion of investment (by analogy with investment databases) in the creation of results of intellectual activity».

The author distinguishes between two types of creativity: Dasein creativity (the result initially arises in the mind of the human creator and qualifies as an object of copyright on the basis of the criterion of creativity) and Man creativity (the result is created through the technical imitation of Dasein’s intellectual activity and qualifies as an object of related rights). The author proposes that related rights in the results of Man creativity be vested in Dasein, that is, in the person who created the conditions for obtaining the result. Thus, the author proposes distinguishing related rights in such RIAs by analogy with the related rights of a database producer [13].

Based on our analysis of the «Suno» Terms of Service, this position is viable, as it is generally implemented in practice and is consistent with the legal nature of artificial intelligence as a set of technological solutions. However, in light of this position, the question of how to distinguish the investment criterion applicable to databases from the criterion of the creative nature of human activity remains open, since different Internet services provide users with different tools that enable them both to engage in creative labor and, in fact, to obtain RIAs without engaging in such labor.

  1. Conclusion

Having established the legal nature of artificial intelligence, examined musical works created using it as objects of intellectual property rights, determined how intellectual property rights in such works are to be distinguished, and presented the views of other authors, we consider it reasonable to conclude that, at the legislative level, the Russian Federation has established intellectual property rights that extend to musical works created using artificial intelligence. Furthermore, in accordance with the dispositive nature of the relevant provisions and the principle of freedom of contract, developers (owners) of Internet services incorporating artificial intelligence for the creation (editing) of musical works are afforded the opportunity, within the limits established by law, to independently distinguish and determine the intellectual property rights in the resulting musical works.

We also consider it necessary to introduce into Russian civil legislation a statutory definition of creative labor, specify the criteria for determining the creative nature of human activity in the creation of RIAs, and expressly recognize musical works created using artificial intelligence as objects of intellectual property rights, while preserving the existing dispositive provisions governing the allocation of intellectual property rights in such works.

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