The International Court of Justice: legal nature
This article will clarify the concepts of international courts, identify their types, provide a detailed examination of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including examples of their court decisions, outline the characteristics of these courts, and compare their features in judicial activities.
justice, legal nature, international court, disputes between states, International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
- Introduction
The issue of the legal nature of international courts is an important topic in our time. In the modern world, international courts are playing an increasingly prominent role: they resolve disputes between states, interpret international treaties, and contribute to the protection of human rights and the development of international law. However, despite their significance, the legal nature of these institutions remains a subject of heated debate. Understanding what exactly international courts are from a legal perspective is the key to solving practical problems [1].
The purpose of the article is to examine the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as the ICTY), to identify the differences and their role in the 21st century.
The legal nature of the International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (established in 1945) has a dual and strictly regulated legal nature: The main judicial body of the UN: According to Article 92 of the UN Charter, the Court is the main judicial body of the organization, but it does not head any “judicial hierarchy”.
The nature of jurisdiction (voluntariness): The Court operates on the basis of the principle of state consent. Jurisdiction can be: contentious — resolves legal disputes between states (decisions are binding only on the parties to the case and only on a specific dispute, according to Article 94 of the UN Charter).
The objectives of the article are:
1) To specify the concept.
2) To identify the types of international courts.
3) To examine in detail the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, providing examples.
4) To outline the characteristics of a court.
5) To compare the judicial activities of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
6) To identify the problems related to the legal nature of international courts.
- Material and methods
Methods of studying the legal nature of the UN Court.
When studying the legal nature of the International Court of Justice, a set of general scientific, private scientific and special legal methods is used:
Formal legal (dogmatic) method: analysis of the text of the UN Charter (Chapter XIV) and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Study of the Rules of Court and official documents.
Comparative legal method: comparison of the International Court of Justice with other international judicial institutions, identification of the specifics of the universal interstate court in comparison with regional or specialized bodies.
Historical and legal method: the study of the process of creation of the Court in 1945.
System analysis method: consideration of the Court as an element of the institutional mechanism of the entire United Nations.
In accordance with the set tasks, it is necessary to clarify the concept [2].
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial body of the UN, established by the UN Charter and operating on the basis of its Statute, created to ensure the rule of law in international relations [3;4].
The International Court of Justice is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, established by the UN Charter on June 26, 1945, to achieve one of the main goals of the UN: “to settle or resolve international disputes or situations that may lead to a breach of peace by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of justice and international law.” The Court began its work in 1946, replacing the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was established in 1920 under the auspices of the League of Nations. The first public hearing of the court took place on April 18, 1946 [1;5].
According to paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Statute, only states may be parties in cases heard by the Court. The Court has jurisdiction over all cases submitted to it by the parties, as well as over all matters specifically provided for by the UN Charter or by existing treaties and conventions (Article 36, paragraph 1). At the same time, the Court’s jurisdiction is optional. This means that a dispute may become an object of consideration by the Court only with the consent of all the disputing parties. Such consent is given in a special agreement between the disputing parties on the transfer of the case to the Court for consideration.
States that are parties to the Statute may, at any time, by making a declaration, recognize the jurisdiction of the Court as binding on all legal disputes, the categories of which are listed in Article 36, paragraph 2: interpretation of a treaty.
The composition of the Court: 15 independent judges elected by the General Assembly and the UN Security Council for a nine‑year term, with the possibility of re‑election. The Court cannot include two or more judges from the same country. Judges are elected from among those who possess the qualifications required to hold the highest judicial positions in their respective countries, or who are recognized experts in the field of international law.
The tasks of the International Court of Justice:
- Resolving legal disputes between states is the main function of the court. It considers cases submitted to it by states in accordance with the norms of international law.
- Transferring a situation involving a conflict of interest to the regime for considering cases before the International Court (countries that are parties to the Statute (Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Statute), a number of other states designated by the UN Security Council (Article 35, paragraph 2), as well as the main bodies and specialized agencies of the UN system (Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the Court’s Statute).
- Issuing advisory opinions on legal issues that may be brought before the court by other UN bodies or specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly.
At the same time, international courts are quite diverse. They can be classified according to various criteria:
By scope: universal (covering the entire international community) and regional (for example, the ECHR in Europe).
In terms of jurisdiction: general (considering various disputes, for example, the International Court of Justice) and special (dealing with a specific area of consideration, such as the International Criminal Court or the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda).
To date, the International Court of Justice is continuing to consider the high‑profile case “Nicaragua v. Germany.” Officially, the case is titled “On the alleged violations of certain international obligations with respect to the occupied Palestinian territory.” One of the main issues in the case is whether the International Court of Justice has the authority to assess the legality of the actions of a state that supplies weapons (Germany) without directly involving the state that uses those weapons (Israel) in the process [6].
The essence of the matter: on March 1, 2024, Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against Germany, accusing it of facilitating genocide in the Gaza Strip.
The main claims are:
- Germany continues to supply weapons to Israel, knowing that they may be used to violate the Genocide Convention (1948) and international humanitarian law;
- Germany has suspended funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East—which is a UN agency providing assistance to Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, and this also violates its obligations;
- Nicaragua has demanded temporary measures: to suspend military supplies to Israel and to resume funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
Germany’s position
Germany rejected all the accusations, stating that:
- Military exports to Israel are of a defensive nature and are based on a “solid legal basis”;
- Nicaragua’s accusations “take neither the facts nor the law into account”;
- Israel is a “necessary third party” (a principle from the Monetary Gold case), and without its participation, the court cannot consider the case on its merits.
On April 30, 2024, the UN International Court of Justice rejected Nicaragua’s request for interim measures by a vote of 15 to 1. The Court held that the circumstances did not require urgent measures under Article 41 of the Statute. However, the Court reminded all states of their obligations to control the transfer of weapons to the conflict zone.
The current status of the case. In September 2026, hearings were held on Germany’s preliminary objections (regarding jurisdiction and the admissibility of the claim). Nicaragua insisted that the case concerned Germany’s own obligations, not Israel’s actions, and therefore the principle of “necessary third party” did not apply. According to Nicaragua, Germany approved military exports to Israel worth more than €1.15 billion between April 2024 and the end of June 2026, and a total of over €1.5 billion since 7 October 2023. Nicaragua is asking the court to dismiss Germany’s preliminary objections and proceed to a substantive hearing.
At present, the court has not yet made a decision on whether it will proceed to a substantive hearing.
Nicaragua’s lawsuit demonstrates a growing trend in strategic litigation, where a state that is not geographically or directly involved in a conflict acts to protect the collective legal values of the international community.
The case raises the question before the law: where does the line lie between protecting fundamental imperative norms in the interests of humanity and the unacceptable abuse of universal jurisdiction for political purposes?
Another court of great importance in international law is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It is particularly important for our analysis: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the first tribunal of its kind after Nuremberg and largely set the standards by which other international courts operate today.
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(Its full name is the International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991) was established by the UN Security Council on 25 May 1993, based on UN Security Council Resolution No. 827. It is located in The Hague (the Netherlands) [7].
The Tribunal has a mandate from the UN Security Council. This distinguishes it from classical international courts, which are established by international treaty. Its purpose is to prosecute individuals responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (gross violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violation of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity). The tribunal considers such serious crimes as premeditated murder, torture, illegal deportation, and hostage‑taking. Prosecution is provided for the use of toxic substances, the senseless destruction of cities or villages, and historical monuments [2;8].
Article Two of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Statute establishes the Tribunal’s [5] authority to prosecute individuals who commit or order the commission of serious violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts directed against persons or property protected by the Geneva Convention:
1) willful killing;
2) torture and inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
3) willful infliction of great suffering, or causing serious injury or damage to health.
4) unlawful, arbitrary, and large‑scale destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity;
5) forcing a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the armed forces of an enemy power.
Currently, the International Tribunal consists of 27 judges: 19 permanent judges (selected by the UN General Assembly based on a list provided by the Security Council; term of office: 4 years; may be re‑elected) and 8 additional judges (term of office: 4 years; may not be re‑elected). The terms of their service are the same as those of the judges of the International Court of Justice. They may be re‑elected.
The Tribunal has the authority to try specific individuals, but not organizations or governments. In its proceedings, the tribunal primarily relied on the doctrine of joint criminal actions, under which each member of an organized group bears individual responsibility for crimes committed by the group within the framework of a common plan or the goals established by it. The court does not accept references to “performance of duties” or “obedience to orders.” The trial cannot begin in the absence of the accused.
The Tribunal does not have the right to impose a death sentence; the maximum penalty the Tribunal can impose is life imprisonment. Persons convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia serve their sentences in one of the states that have signed the relevant agreement with the UN.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia made an important contribution to international law: the Tribunal significantly developed the norms of international criminal law, in particular, it specified the elements of individual criminal responsibility. At the same time, in its practice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia sometimes applied the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, which was not explicitly provided for in the Statute of the Tribunal.
The activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have sparked and continue to spark heated debates. Among the arguments put forward by critics are doubts about the legality of the tribunal’s establishment by the Security Council, questions regarding compliance with the principles of justice and the presumption of innocence (in certain trials), as well as accusations of politicization of the trials and bias.
In 2017, the main work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was completed, and the review of appeals was transferred to the specially established International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.
As an example, let us consider the case of Stanišić and Simatović, which went through several instances and ended with an ambiguous decision. It shows how difficult it is for international justice to strike a balance between fairness and legal rigor.
The case was considered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and then by its successor, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Both bodies were established by the UN.
Jovica Stanišić is the former head of the State Security Service. The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs from late 1991 to 1998, one of the closest associates of President Slobodan Milošević.
Franko “Frankie” Simatović, an employee of the same service, commander of the special unit “red berets” (officially – the Special Operations Unit), which carried out “delicate” assignments for the Serbian leadership.
They were accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise involving a campaign to forcibly and permanently expel non‑Serb populations (Croats and Bosnian Muslims) from the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991–1995. According to the prosecution, Stanišić and Simatović created, financed, trained, and armed Serb formations and special units that carried out murders, deportations, persecutions, and forced relocations of the civilian population.
The development of the case: in 2003, Serbia extradited both to The Hague; from 2009 to 2013, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia considered the case and in May 2013 acquitted the defendants: the prosecution failed to prove their direct involvement in the crimes. However, the prosecutor’s office filed an appeal, and in December 2015, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia appellate court overturned the acquittal and sent the case for reconsideration. To this end, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, established to complete the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, was deployed. The retrial began in June 2017. In June 2021, the MOMUT court delivered a guilty verdict: Stanišić and Simatović were found guilty on all counts (aiding and abetting murder, deportation, forcible transfer, persecution) and each was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The defendants did not admit their guilt [9].
This decision marked the first instance in which high‑ranking Serbian officials from the Slobodan Milošević regime of the 1990s were found guilty of war crimes committed in Bosnia.
The case of Jovica Stanišić and Franjo Šimović is considered one of the most significant in the practice of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. It addresses key issues of international justice: the criteria for liability for crimes against humanity, the standards of proof, and the limits of appellate review.
Having examined the judicial activities of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, their decisions and specific features, it is possible to identify a number of problems related to their legal nature. International courts do not fit into the classical model of national justice because they do not have a single sovereign standing above the parties. This gives rise to several interrelated contradictions [10].
- The basis of jurisdiction is consent, not coercion.
The International Court of Justice operates on the basis of an optional clause (Article 36 of the Statute): it allows states to retain their sovereignty while simultaneously creating a stable system of international justice; states themselves decide whether to recognize its jurisdiction. This gives rise to the “dual” nature of the court: it is both a UN body and an arbitration by agreement of the parties.
Example: in the case “Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua” (1986), the United States stated that its reservation excluded disputes under multilateral treaties, and after losing, it simply withdrew from the mandatory jurisdiction. The court found the US actions to be unlawful, but it proved impossible to enforce the decision.
- The problem of enforcement.
International courts do not have their own enforcement mechanism. The enforcement of the International Court of Justice decisions depends on the UN Security Council (Article 94 of the Charter), where the veto power of the permanent members applies.
Example: in the same Nicaragua v. USA case. The USA blocked the enforcement of the decision through the UN Security Council. A paradox arises: the court issues a legally binding decision, but the mechanism for its implementation is politically blocked [9].
- The conflict between the “judicial” and “political” principles.
The establishment and competence of the International Court of Justice are determined by the political will of states. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, unlike the International Court of Justice, was established by a Security Council resolution (827 of 1993), not by a treaty – that is, by the will of a limited number of states, not by the consent of all.
This gave rise to a debate about legitimacy: can the UN Security Council, a political body, create a judicial body with compulsory jurisdiction?
Example: in the Tadić case (1995), the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia itself decided the issue of the legality of its own establishment, acknowledging that the Security Council had acted within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The court, in essence, confirmed its own legitimacy – a situation that is impossible in national law, where the court does not decide the issue of the constitutionality of its own establishment.
- The tribunal’s primacy over national courts (primacy).
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had primacy over national courts (Article 9 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Statute): it could request a case at any stage. This is a direct intrusion into the sovereignty of states, justified by the goals of international criminal justice.
Example: The Tadić case – Germany had already detained the accused but was forced to hand him over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The question arises: what is the nature of such primacy — is it a manifestation of supranational authority or a temporary delegation of sovereign powers?
- The duality of sources of law.
The International Court of Justice of the United Nations applies international treaties, custom, and general principles of law (Article 38 of the Statute), but the very concept of “general principles” is vague. The Court is forced to фактически create law by filling in gaps, even though it formally denies having a law‑making function.
Example: in the case “On the Corfu Channel” (1949), the Court derived the principle of “elementary considerations of humanity” as an independent basis for liability, essentially creating a norm that was not enshrined in a treaty.
From the above, the main paradox emerges: the international court is mandatory in terms of its decisions, but optional in terms of jurisdiction, and its effectiveness depends not on the law, but on the political will of states to implement its acts.
In the study of the legal nature, there are a number of key problematic issues that give rise to the most heated debates in the science of international law and in practice.
Below are the main clusters of problems that can be used as the basis for chapters of a scientific work or for critical analysis.
- The crisis of compulsory jurisdiction and “state consent”
Problem: The Court does not have automatic (universal) compulsory jurisdiction. For the International Court of Justice of the United Nations to consider a dispute, the state’s direct consent is required (in the form of a special agreement, a clause in a treaty, or a declaration under Article 36 of the Statute).
The crux of the problem is that states often evade justice, withdraw their declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the UN International Court of Justice (as, for example, the United States did after the Nicaragua v. United States case in the 1980s), or formulate broad reservations that paralyze the possibility of considering a dispute. This calls into question the effectiveness of the Court as the “main” judicial body of the planet.
- The legal force of decisions: sources of law vs. “auxiliary means”
Problem: According to Article 59 of the Statute, a decision of the Court is binding only on the parties to the case and only in that specific case. Article 38 classifies judicial decisions as merely auxiliary means for the determination of legal norms.
The essence of the problem: in practice, the International Court of Justice of the United Nations constantly refers to its past decisions, forming stable precedents. A legal paradox arises: formally, there is no case law in the UN system, but in practice, the Court’s legal positions (jurisprudence) are recognized by states as a normative reference point. Scholarship is still debating the “law‑making” function of the Court.
- The problem of enforcing decisions and the politicization of the Security Council
Problem: If a state fails to comply with a Court decision, the other party has the right to appeal to the UN Security Council (Article 94 of the UN Charter), which may take action.
Суть of the problem: The enforcement mechanism is not of a legal nature, but purely political. If a permanent member of the UN Security Council (or its close ally) is the violator, it will simply block any resolution using its veto power. As a result, international justice turns out to be legally strong, but executively powerless against the great powers.
- The boundaries of advisory jurisdiction
Problem: The Court’s advisory opinions are not formally binding, but they carry enormous moral and legal weight.
The crux of the problem: UN bodies (for example, the General Assembly) often use requests to the Court as a political tool to exert pressure in bilateral disputes, bypassing the requirement for states’ consent (for example, opinions on the wall in the Palestinian territories, on Kosovo, or on the Chagos Archipelago). This raises the question: do UN institutions abuse the Court’s authority to address purely political issues?
- Competition of jurisdictions (“fragmentation” of international law)
Problem: over the past few decades, numerous specialized and regional courts have emerged.
The essence of the problem: the UN International Court of Justice is losing its monopoly on the interpretation of international law. Different judicial bodies may interpret the same norms of general international law in different ways (a classic example is the dispute between the UN International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia regarding the criteria for a state’s “effective” or “comprehensive” control over armed groups). This undermines the unity of the international legal system.
Results and discussion
In the course of the research, it was managed:
1) to define the concept more precisely.
2) to identify the types of international courts;
3) to examine the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in detail, providing examples;
4) to outline the characteristics of such courts;
5) to compare the judicial activities of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
6) to identify the key issues concerning the legal nature of international courts.
Conclusion
In the 21st century, international courts are an important mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes, the protection of human rights, and the ensuring of the accountability of states and other subjects of international law. Their legal nature is determined by international treaties, the principles of independence, legality, adversarial proceedings, and the binding nature of court decisions.
The main features of modern international courts are limited jurisdiction, dependence on the consent of states, differences in legal systems, and the difficulties of enforcing decisions. To enhance their effectiveness, it is necessary to strengthen the independence of judges, improve case review procedures, ensure a uniform interpretation of international norms, and develop mechanisms for enforcing judicial acts.
Thus, despite the existing political and legal challenges, international courts retain their significance as key institutions of the international legal order and contribute to the development of cooperation, justice, and the rule of law.
Current areas of research into the legal nature and practice of the UN International Court of Justice
In modern international legal doctrine (including works published in recent years), several key vectors of scholarly analysis stand out:
The Court’s decisions and legal positions as a source of international law.
The debate on the presence or absence of elements of judicial law‑making [11]. Researchers analyze how the Court does not merely apply the law, but identifies, specifies and develops the norms of international customary and treaty law.
Ways to reform and enhance the effectiveness of the Court.
Studies devoted to optimizing court proceedings and speeding up case consideration.
New challenges in subject‑matter jurisdiction (ecology, cyberspace, climate). An analysis of the role of the UN International Court of Justice in considering claims related to climate change, transboundary environmental damage, and the application of international humanitarian law in modern armed conflicts.
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