The most important component of the geopolitical and social system of «Russia» has always been its Armed Forces, which were formed as a social community and as a large technical and economic subsystem. It is no coincidence that in Russian society the army was perceived as «its own», and the main defensive wars of 1812 and 1941-1945 turned into domestic ones.

Domestic history shows that the development strategy of the Russian Armed Forces is recognized and accepted by the whole society. An integral part of the ongoing socio-economic course is a clear, clearly articulated military-industrial policy aimed, in essence, at ensuring the country’s competitiveness in the world, the use of innovative development factors, and achieving high standards of living standards of the population.

A purposeful state policy in the military sphere affects not only the formation of a national security system, an adequate modern innovative economy and scientific and technical potential, but also the entire system of science, education and upbringing, social security, employment and others.

The historical experience of Russia in this direction is at the center of the influence of domestic scientists (1).

The collapse of the USSR and the bloc of its allies was a powerful factor in the development of an alarming situation in the world community. The unipolarity of the world, the elimination of the most powerful military-defense potential of the USSR led the world, strange as it might sound, into the abyss of a civilizational crisis.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the opinion has prevailed in Russia that in modern conditions there is no need for a high military-strategic potential, and the existing military-industrial production needs to be converted into civilian. The military-industrial complex (MIC) was essentially deprived of state support (4). As a result, not only there was a collapse of production, the loss of important technologies, a decrease in the competitiveness of high-tech production, but also a sharp impoverishment of the people, aggravation of social problems in a number of cities and regions of the country.

The Russian army and the military-industrial complex are an extremely complex system, the development of which has great social consequences. This is convincingly, in our opinion, confirmed by the cycles of national and world history.

Building a model of financing the military budget as an important issue of state policy, Russian scientists see a direct dependence of the country’s economic growth on military spending (high or low) (5).

Table 1

The position of famous scientists S.A. Kapitsa, S.P. Kurdyumov, G.G. Malinetsky on the role of the military-industrial complex in the history and life of the country is interesting. The construction of mathematical models of historical phenomena led them to the idea that military spending can help solve purely economic and social problems (increased employment, increased consumer demand, increased scientific and technological progress, etc.). They contribute to economic growth (increase in GDP) and stimulate the development of civilian industries. When the military component of politics ceases to be significant, it significantly (and sometimes decisively) undermines the state of the state and its independence (2).

For centuries, Russia has been offering and defending its own type of lifestyle. The systemic triad «spirituality — collectivism — justice» was complemented by the understanding of the need to serve the Fatherland and was based on a set of high technologies in military affairs. From Peter the Great, an understanding was formed that the importance and effectiveness of the military-military complex is much more important than their cost. An interesting point of view is substantiated by G.G. Malinetsky. «But in the absence of war, weapons are money thrown away, funds taken away from sectors of the economy capable of producing something useful,» says philistine common sense. And here he is wrong. The economy is a complex, nonlinear, self-organizing system. And in certain phases of its development, defense spending is more than reasonable in a purely economic sense» (3). The social system in Russia has developed in such a way that an increase in the defense order (not by percentages, but at times) with skillful, strategically verified leadership has a stimulating effect on the entire domestic economy. Setting goals and objectives for the system as a whole played a crucial role in this.

The capabilities of defense enterprises became the «locomotive» not only of economic development as a whole, but also of the formation of the social sphere as a whole. The promotion of dual technologies into civilian production, the development of so-called closed administrative territories around many defense enterprises, where many scientific and technical social and spiritual and intellectual problems were solved in a comprehensive and systematic manner.

The main difference between the Russian, Russian army and the Western ones was that it did not know the traditions of mercenary work, showed high efficiency in defensive, domestic wars. From century to century, its main core «service to the Fatherland!» was cultivated and polished, and in the Soviet period — «protection of the Fatherland as a sacred duty of every citizen!». It was in Russia that a one-of-a-kind multinational, non-class and non-pedigree army emerged, not imbued with militarism and caste consciousness.

«A hired force is not a force! Only the earth is strong. Pay your poor people with land, Prince John, and you will be invincible!

… Get up, get ready konno, crowded, armed! First of all, protect your land yourself. The earth is the common source of your life» (6).

The formation of the national armed forces has its roots in the most ancient Novgorod-Kiev period of our history.

You should select a position well-known historians A. Stepanov and A. Utkin, who, analyzing the unique and specific qualities of the ancient building, concluded that from the outset, gaining national-state identity of the Russian state was formed as a military state society (7).

In the XVII century in Russia, the system of governance became clear shape when there was an attachment of all classes to the public service, including military.

The army traditionally belonged to the number of state institutions, the position and prestige of which was the highest. This is quite natural: neither society nor the state could allow otherwise without jeopardizing their very existence.

The formation of the Russian military system was largely determined by the geopolitical position of Russia and its historical destiny in accordance with this. Russia has fought two-thirds of its life. From 1240 to 1462 (for 222 years) — two hundred wars and invasions. From the fourteenth century to the twentieth (for 525 years) Sukhotin counts 329 years of war. One Tatar yoke lasted 250 years, and the last time Moscow was imposed by the Tatars at the very end of the sixteenth century. «From century to century, our concern was not about how to get better or how to live easier, but only about how to somehow live, hold out, get out of another trouble, overcome another danger: not as justice and happiness to get, but as an enemy or misfortune to get, and also: how not to unleash a general destructive turmoil in pursuit of «relief» and «happiness»…», wrote the Russian philosopher thinker I.A. Ilyin (8).

One of the main achievements of the past is the code of morality developed over centuries in the Russian army. We are talking, first of all, about such enduring values as honor and military duty of officers. Weapons and military equipment were improved, tactics and strategy underwent changes. But the heroism of the Russian troops, their steadfastness in battle, the ability to sacrifice themselves, loyalty to the oath and military duty, and reverence for military traditions remained unchanged for centuries.

The Russian school has been the standard of military education and training for centuries. The pets of Russian military educational institutions were statesmen and famous scientists, generals and masters of culture.

The historical and geographical conditions in which Russia was born and strengthened forced it to constantly fight for its state and national independence. The formation of the national character and attitude to military service took place in conditions when the strength, heroism, courage and bravery of those who spared neither strength nor life itself, defending their native land, were glorified in folk epics, songs, epics, fairy tales. Defenders of the Fatherland have always enjoyed the love of the people, and military service was considered, although difficult, dangerous, but honorable, and most importantly — necessary. And this made it possible to educate Russian soldiers with qualities that both allies and opponents have always noted: determination in the offensive, fortitude in defense, courage, mutual assistance and contempt for death in the most seemingly critical moments of the battle.

It is known that the appearance of the army of any state, any socio-economic formation, first of all, depends on the culture of the officer corps, on its readiness to serve the Motherland, on its training, competence, concentration, determination, loyalty and honor. In our opinion, it is legitimate to raise the question that the progressive traditions of the Russian army are, first and foremost, the traditions of the officer corps. They were formed not for decades— but for centuries they were polished in the conditions of battles and constant care for the common soldier, replenished with new facets of morality, citizenship, citizenship (9).

It can be argued that the formation of the glorious traditions of the Russian army began from the moment when Peter I refused to recruit mercenaries. The Russian army and Navy switched to recruitment through recruitment kits. This system made it possible to have a reliable source of replenishment of the army and navy with ordinary personnel. The officers were exclusively noble and were trained both in the established system of military educational institutions and directly in the troops of the Guard, the rank and file of which were nobles who left there as officers in army regiments. All nobles were obliged to serve, an exception to this general rule established by Peter I could only be granted to the seriously wounded or terminally ill.

Officers, being brought up in the Spartan spirit and love for their work, more than once proved their superiority over the command staff of foreign armies, stood above them, because they, by virtue of their class privileges, enjoyed all kinds of benefits and very often treated the service with contempt. Russian officers considered military service their patriotic duty. The most important testament of Peter I, which entered into the flesh and blood of the Russian officers, became the main service to the Fatherland — «In service — honor» (10).

The period of Catherine II’s reign is characterized by the fact that the main spirit of military laws was the requirement to diligently teach what would have to be done in the war. The names of the famous generals P.A. Rumyantsev, G.A. Potemkin, A.V. Suvorov, their military and scientific works determined the spirit of the Russian army at that time. Historical documents testify to the popularity of P.A. Rumyantsev in the army. In the «Instructions of the infantry regiment to the colonel» Rumyantsev wrote: «The maintenance of a good order in a regiment, of course, depends above all on the serviceability of officers, and for this it is necessary for him to use a special art in that, and in a good way to encourage every officer to diligently fulfill his position and to decent behavior» (11).

In the following years, the ideas on which Peter’s officers grew were amenable to significant changes. In the Russian army there were imitators of the ruinous Prussian system of training and education of troops, which was at odds with the character of our people. Patronage and favorism flourished. A new blow to the officer system was inflicted in 1798 by Paul I, dismissing from the army all officers of non-noble origin and categorically forbidding the chiefs of regiments to submit non-commissioned officers from among the non-nobility for production as officers. The officer corps became purely noble. This anti-national activity was met with an indignant protest by A.V. Suvorov. His saying is known: «Powder is not gunpowder, hedgehogs are not guns, scythes are not cleavers, we are not Germans, but Russians!».

Alexander I inherited the «Gatchina traditions» to the strongest extent. The parade ground training of the troops in his reign was brought to an unheard-of perfection in Potsdam. In the campaign of 1805, the entire campaign — from St. Petersburg to Austerlitz, the guard went in step. For 10 years — from 1805 to 1815 — Russia continuously participated in wars, simultaneously at various theaters. At least 1,500,000 people with Cossacks and militia were under arms — permanently or temporarily — during this period (which accounted for 4 percent of the country’s 40 million population).

The Patriotic War of 1812 took a special place in the history of Russia. «Of all my battles,» Napoleon later recalled, «the most terrible is what I gave at Moscow. The French have shown themselves worthy of winning it, and the Russians are called invincible.» This war was a people’s war. The armed armies of Europe faced the armed Russian people. The Russian professional army and the armed people in the person of partisans and militia brilliantly complemented each other.

The military historian A.A. Kersnovsky is right, who wrote that the main mistake of the ruler of Europe is a psychological mistake. «He didn’t know Russia, and even less Russians. Perhaps the most tragic moment of his extraordinary life was the vain waiting for the «boyars» at the Moscow Outpost. He had never heard anything about Oslyabya and Peresvet, Pozharsky and Minin, Hermogenes and Susanin. And if he were destined to comprehend the genius of the people who gave birth to them, then his foot would not set foot on Russian soil.» [21]

The historical and sociological cross-section of the armies of Kutuzov and Napoleon is interesting.

Paradoxically, but a fact: in terms of its military and economic potential, feudal Russia surpassed bourgeois France. There were huge military factories in the country that produced more weapons and ammunition than in France. However, the quality of guns and sabers was lower than European ones. According to the memoirs of the officers of the Russian army, sometimes at the first blow with a saber the blade flew off the hilt, the bayonets bent … Thus, it was not necessary to talk about high-quality military-technical superiority. Everything was decided by strategic, subjective and moral factors.

The generalized portrait of the officers of the opposing armies attracts attention in this regard. According to the analysis of 1,315 form lists stored in the Central State Guard of Russia, at the beginning of 1812, there were 17,139 officers in the Russian army. 89 percent of the command staff were nobles, but most of them did not own either serfs or real estate. The richest officer of the regiment at that time had 200 serfs, and the rest at best owned a few peasants and a small village. Receiving a small salary, the Russian officer lived by the service and tried to succeed in it.

The military historian A.A. Kersnovsky is right, who wrote that Napoleon’s main mistake was a psychological mistake. «He didn’t know Russia, and even less Russians. Perhaps the most tragic moment of his extraordinary life was the vain waiting for the «boyars» at the Moscow Outpost. He had never heard anything about Oslyabya and Peresvet, Pozharsky and Minin, Hermogenes and Susanin. And if he were destined to comprehend the genius of the people who gave birth to them, then his foot would not set foot on Russian soil» (12).

For the study of our problem, the historical and sociological cross-section of the armies of Kutuzov and Napoleon is interesting.

Paradoxically, but a fact: in terms of its military and economic potential, feudal Russia surpassed bourgeois France. There were huge military factories in the country that produced more weapons and ammunition than in France. However, the quality of guns and sabers was lower than European ones. According to the memoirs of the officers of the Russian army, sometimes at the first blow with a saber the blade flew off the hilt, the bayonets bent. Thus, there was no need to talk about high-quality military-technical superiority. Everything was decided by strategic, subjective and moral factors.

The generalized portrait of the officers of the opposing armies attracts attention in this regard. According to the analysis of 1,315 form lists stored in the Central State Guard of Russia, at the beginning of 1812, there were 17,139 officers in the Russian army. 89 percent of the command staff were nobles, but most of them did not own either serfs or real estate. The richest officer of the regiment at that time had 200 serfs, and the rest at best owned a few peasants and a small village. Receiving a small salary, the Russian officer lived by the service and tried to succeed in it.

The officer of the Russian army was young: 37 percent of the total number of officers were officers aged 20 to 25 years; 26.9 percent — 26-30; 13.6 percent — 31-35 and 10.1 percent — 36-40 years. However, this did not prevent 51 percent of officers from receiving baptism of fire before the Patriotic War, and in 36.5 percent of the studied forms there are records of the participation of officers in more than 10 battles. Only 9 percent were married. Special or higher education was not compulsory. Young nobles received home education, and this was considered sufficient. Future Russian officers acquired the necessary professional knowledge directly in the regiment where they began their service (13).

The dramatic fate of the Russian officer and soldier consisted in the fact that the interests of the ruling forces that used the army during the second half of the XIX century in wars, which are often not necessary for Russia, and those concepts of honor, dignity, glory of the Fatherland that have been formed in the Russian army for centuries diverged.

The well-known paradox of Russian history and the army is connected precisely with the high morality of a large number of the officer corps, the desire and desire to serve not primarily for money, but for the interests and needs of the Fatherland. Wars turned out to be lost if there was an excellent cadre of officers in the army. However, during the war, the officers were abundantly replenished with reserve officers and young officers of accelerated training. This, of course, could not but affect the morale and moral mood in the army.

The courage and self-sacrifice of the Russian soldier has always been the subject of admiration, reflection and misunderstanding at the same time among politicians and military leaders of many countries. One of those who came to understand these qualities of the Russian soldier was F. Engels. He very accurately explained the deep foundations of the manifestation of these qualities: «The Russian soldier is undoubtedly very brave. While the tactical task was being solved by the offensive of infantry masses acting in a closed formation, the Russian soldier was in his element. All his life experience has taught him to hold fast to his comrades. In the village there is still a semi-communist community, in the city there is the cooperative work of the artel, everywhere there is … mutual responsibility of comrades for each other… This trait is preserved in the Russian and in the military, combined into battalions of the Russian masses is almost impossible to break, the more serious the risk, the denser they merge into a single compact unit» (14).

However, the nineteenth century in relation to the development of the Russian army, military art, the formation of the glorious traditions of the Russian military in General can be defined as the age of the lack of national military doctrine.

This is how Russia entered the twentieth century. Even such bright minds in military affairs as Generals Skobelev, Gurko, N.K. Butovsky, M.D. Grulev, K.K. Kuzminsky and others could not overcome the attempts of the tsarist entourage to turn the Russian army into an instrument of political struggle both outside and inside the country.

Nicholas II, like his predecessors, held in his hands the fullness of the highest civil and military power. The political failure of the last emperor not only led to the death of the military-state society in the form of the Russian Empire, but also put Russia itself on the verge of destruction as an independent entity.

Thus, in 1914-1916, the social appearance of the officer corps radically changed. Never in the pre-war years was there such a variety. All estates of the Russian Empire became officers, even those who previously could not think about a military career. The total number of officers in this period was 275 thousand people.

The First World War and the events of 1917 became a serious psychological test for the Russian armed forces. Already during the two years of the war, the monarchical fervor was gradually fading.

The February Revolution completed the process of democratization of the officer corps: all noble privileges were abolished. The October revolution and the Civil War split the entire Russian society, including the officers, into two hostile camps. Interestingly, out of 275 thousand officers, a significant part took the side of the new, Soviet government. Among them are many representatives of the generals and senior officers. About 85% of officers sided with the new government, and 15% turned out to be members of the White Movement (15).

The Red Army, and later the Soviet Army, acted as an ideal model of public organization, was perceived in society as the main guardian of the highest values of Soviet society. It was assumed that the army, as a corporation, does not have its own goals and interests, entirely serves a more important subject — the state. The army turned out to be the main exponent of the ideas of sovereignty and, moreover, of geopolitical national claims.

V.F. Shapovalov is right, emphasizing that the Armed Forces were created by the creative force of the talent of the entire people (16).

The Russian army as a community of people, peoples, estates, classes, religions, was fastened with hoops of patriotism, culture, morality. It acted in practical and spiritual spheres as a mechanism of unity of numerous and various national, cultural, religious, spiritual elements. This peculiar manifestation of the most important property of the Russian army was noted by D.S. Likhachev. According to the academician, the true meaning of the author’s appeal «The Words about Igor’s Regiment» was not an attempt to organize one or another approach, but a broader and bolder task — to unite public opinion against the feudal strife of princes, to stigmatize harmful feudal ideas in public opinion, to mobilize public opinion against the search for personal glory, personal honor by princes… «The task of the Word was not only military, but also ideological unity of Russian people» (17).

The events at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, in their scale and speed of the perfect, raised the question of the «depth of memory» in historical events for scientists. In our opinion, the well-known mathematicians S.P. Kapitsa, S.P. Kurdyumov, G.G. Malinetsky are right, who noted that «common sense suggests that it is not appropriate for the king to blame the reforms of his great-great-grandfather for the failure of his policy and the failures of the kingdom. In the end, both he and his father and grandfather had the opportunity to make adjustments» (18).

Thus, both the theoretical study of the problem and the analysis of national history show that the strategy and tactics of the development process of the military-industrial complex, according to the requirements of the time, create a stable system of containment of the military potential of rival countries. Ensuring Russia’s defense capability, shifting the focus to supporting science and high-tech industries, and technologies in dynamics and in conjunction with the stages of solving environmental and social problems stimulate the development of the domestic economy and the socio-educational sphere as a whole. The military-industrial complex as an important segment provides socio-economic optimization of the entire system of life of Russian society.